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NOTES
BAUM ESTATE: INTERPRETATION OF WORD "ORIGINAL"
FAVORS CHARITABLE BEQUESTS
In Baum Estate' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the validity
of charitable bequests contained in a will executed less than thirty days before
the death of the testatrix.
In September 1955, the testatrix Rose Baum executed a will 2 which con'-
tained a specific bequest and devise of her house and household goods to a
friend and a bequest of her residuary estate in equal shares to three designated
charities. When the attorney prepared this will a carbon copy was simulta-
neously typed for his files. During a subsequent illness the testatrix became
dissatisfied with the friend to whom she had bequeathed her house and house-
hold goods and directed her attorney to prepare a new will. On April 23, 1958,
this new will3 was executed by the testatrix while in the hospital and witnessed
by her attorney and a nurse. The 1958 will contained a one hundred dollar
bequest to the friend and a bequest of the residuary estate to charity identical
to the charitable bequest of the 1955 will. After the 1958 will was executed the
testatrix directed her attorney to destroy the executed ribbon copy of the 1955
will which was done in her presence. On May 22, 1958, nine days after execu-
tion of the 1958 will the testatrix died leaving no natural heirs. The Common-
wealth claimed the entire residuary estate of the testatrix as statutory heir 4
on the basis that the thirty day provision of section 180.7(1) of the Pennsyl-
vania Wills Act 5 made the charitable bequests of the 1958 will invalid.
Section 180.7(1) of the Wills Act provides that "any bequest or devise
for religious or charitable purposes included in a will or codicil executed
within thirty days of death of the testator shall be invalid.., ." There are two
exceptions to this thirty day restriction on charitable and religious bequests.
The first permits such charitable bequests if "all who would benefit by its
invalidity agree that it shall be valid.' 7 The second exception to section
180.7(1) provides:
1. 418 Pa. 404, 211 A.2d 521 (1965).
2. Record, pp. 33a, 34a, Baum Estate, 418 Pa. 404, 211 A.2d 521 (1965).
3. Record, pp. 10a, 11a.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.3(6) (1950). It is necessary to consider the possibility
of different equities when a natural heir is involved.




.. unless the testator directs otherwise, if such a will or codicil shall
revoke or supersede a prior will or codicil executed at least thirty
days before the testator's death, and not theretofore revoked or
superseded and the original of which can be produced in legible
condition, and if each instrument shall contain an identical gift for
substantially the same religious or charitable purpose, the gift in
the later will or codicil shall be valid.8
In Baum the testatrix died nine days after execution of the 1958 will.
Therefore the charitable bequests contained therein were invalid under the
thirty day provision of section 180.7(1) unless one of the exceptions was
applicable. The first exception is obviously inapplicable in the instant case
since the sole beneficiary has contested the bequests. To determine whether the
facts of Baum come within the second exception, it is necessary to analyze
the statute.
The language of the second exception dictates four specific requirements
to be satisfied. First, the probated will must revoke a prior will executed at
least thirty days before the testator's death. This requirement was satisfied in
Baum since the 1958 will revoked the 1955 will which was executed two
years and seven months before the death of the testatrix.
Second, the prior will cannot be revoked or superseded before the subse-
quent will would cause revocation. In the instant case this requirement also
was fulfilled since the facts show the 1955 will remained the will of the
testatrix until the 1958 will was executed. The testatrix's actions certainly
indicate that the 1955 will was still in effect when the 1958 will was executed
since she ordered it destroyed.
Third, there must be identical gifts for substantially the same charitable
purpose. Both wills in the present case contained identical bequests so there
can be no question as to the satisfaction of this requirement.
Fourth, the exception requires "the original of which can be produced."
This means that the "original" of the prior (1955) will must be produced at
probate. This requirement is the issue of Baum's Estate. The ribbon copy of
the prior (1955) will obviously could not be produced since it had been
destroyed when the 1958 will was executed. To meet the requirement of
producing the "original" of the prior will the attorney for the charities
introduced the unexecuted carbon copy of the 1955 will. To counter, the
Commonwealth contended that "original" meant only the ribbon copy of the
1955 will and therefore the carbon copy could not be introduced.9 The
Orphan's Court of Erie County held that the unsigned carbon copy of
8. Ibid.
9. Brief for appellants, p. 10, Baum Estate, 418 Pa. 404, 211 A.2d 521 (1965).
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the prior will was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of "original."' 10
Therefore the charitable bequests were declared to be valid under the second
exception to section 180.7 (1). On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed.
It is the purpose of this note to analyze the Baum court's interpretation
of the word "original" contained in the exception to section 180.7(1) since
the decision was based upon the meaning of this key word. This note also
offers suggestions to attorneys who are or may become involved with chari-
table bequests and the consequences of section 180.7(1) of the Wills Act.
Original is defined as "the first copy or archetype."" This would lead to
a conclusion that only a ribbon copy could serve as an original. But there is
also included within the definition that "a carbon impression of a letter
written on a typewriter, made by the same stroke of the keys as the companion
impression, is an 'original.' "12 As is true with legal words or phrases it is
possible that the definition of the word "original" may differ between states
and may vary according to the situation.1" The Baum court makes the point
that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in a vacuum. 14 It is apparent
that in order to establish the meaning of "original" as regards to section
180.7(1) it is necessary to place the word in context.
The exception to section 180.7(1) requires production of the "original"
prior will. Therefore the purpose of introducing the prior will would aid
in establishing the contextual meaning of "original." The prior will required
by section 180.7(1) is not being offered to probate since it has been revoked
by the subsequent will. 15 A logical conclusion appears to be that the prior will
is being used in an evidential capacity and that section 180.7(1) requires
the introduction of the prior will as proof of the testator's intent. 6
The purpose of the thirty day restriction on charitable bequests is "to
make reasonably sure that testamentary gifts to religion or charity were the
result of deliberate intent of the testator."' 7 Thus if it can be proven that
10. 14 Fid. Rep. 519 (1965).
11. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
12. Ibid.
13. Compare State v. Albertalli, 78 N.J. 90, 73 Atl. 128 (1909) (carbon copy
evidence of originality), with Chrismer v. Chrismer, 103 Ohio App. 23, 144 N.E.2d 494
(1956) (carbon copy not regarded as duplicate original). See generally Annot., 65
A.L.R.2d 342 (1959).
14. 418 at 410, 211 A.2d at 524.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1950). See also In re Burtt's Estate, 353 Pa.
217, 44 A.2d 670 (1946).
16. The purpose of the condition was merely to establish reliably that there
was such a prior document in order to establish that the testator had a charitable intent
prior to being influenced by the imminence of death. Brief for Appellee, p. 13, Baun
Estate, 418 Pa. 404, 211 A.2d 521 (1965).
17. Paxson's Estate, 221 Pa. 98, 111, 70 Atl. 280, 285 (1908).
1965]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
a testator had charitable intentions for a period longer than thirty days before
death the basic purpose of the thirty day restriction is satisfied. Section
180.7(1) provides only one method of proving that this charitable intent
existed for more than the thirty day restrictive period and this is the introduc-
ing of the "original" prior will.
Since the prior will is being offered as evidence of the testator's intent, it
follows that rules of evidence are pertinent. There are several Pennsylvania
cases dealing with the meaning of original in connection with the "best
evidence rule.' 8 This raises the issue as to whether the best evidence rule
cases are directly on point regarding section 180.7(1) since the word
"original" is within a specific statute. Without becoming involved with this
issue it is recognized that the "best evidence rule" cases may be applicable
only through analogy. The court in Baum made no mention of the specific
rule though it did cite cases involving the rule.19
There has developed in the Pennsylvania best evidence law the doctrine
of the duplicate original. This doctrine was stated in the oft-cited case of
John Wanamaker v. Chase,20 which states, "where several copies of a writing
are made at the same time by the same mechanical operation each is to be
regarded as an original. '21 The Baum court in part substantiates its holding
that an unsigned carbon copy made simultaneously with the ribbon copy is an
original on the Wanamaker definition. 22 There are, however, later cases which
appear to limit the broad statement of Wananmker.
In Cole v. Ellwood Power Company23 the facts involved the admissibility
of a duplicate of a notice to quit. The court held a carbon copy to be an original
reasoning that it was "made on a typewriter at the same time as the original,
signed by the same officers in the same manner, and in every respect was an
exact duplicate."'24 Thus Cole holds that a carbon copy is an original if it is
signed. The Wananaker court did not mention the necessity of a signature but
this is understandable since Wananaker involved bookkeeping records where
no signature is necessary either on the ribbon copy or the carbons. Reading
Cole in light of Wanamaker raises a question regarding the exact holding of
the Cole court. Is Cole applicable only to cases involving carbons where the
ribbon must be signed or does the holding also include the situation where
the ribbon copy need not be signed? If the Cole holding does include the
18. The best evidence of the contents of the writing is the document itself, and that
proof of a lower degree amounts to secondary evidence. See generally 20 AM. JUR.,
Evidence § 406 (1931).
19. 418 Pa. at 409, 410, 211 A.2d at 523, 524.
20. 81 Pa. Super. 201 (1923).
21. Id. at 203.
22. 418 Pa. at 409, 211 A.2d at 523.
23. 216 Pa. 283, 65 Atl. 678 (1907).
24. Id. at 289, 290, 65 Atl. at 680.
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instances where the ribbon copy does not have to be signed then Wanamaker
would appear to be overruled sub silentio.
The language used in Brenner v. Lesher25 indicates that a carbon copy
may not have to be signed in order to qualify as a duplicate original. 26 This
implication is repudiated, however, in Long v. Long 27 where the validity of
a carbon copy of a trust agreement involving realty was questioned. The
Long court did not accept the contention that an unsigned carbon was a
duplicate original. Expanding Brenner, the court declared "where several
duplicates of a written statement are made, by the same mechanical operation,
the first impression and all others may be regarded as duplicate originals ...
when duly signed and delivered."
'28
In view of Cole and Long it would seem that a carbon copy is regarded as
a duplicate original only if it is signed.2 9 A narrow construction of Cole and
Long leads to the conclusion that a carbon copy must be signed to qualify as
a duplicate original if the ribbon copy. required a signature. A broad interpre-
tation of Cole and Long suggests that a carbon copy is a duplicate original
only when it is signed. If the ribbon copy does not require a signature then
the carbons cannot qualify as originals. It must be noted that the ribbon copy
in Baum did require a signature. Therefore the Cole and Long cases are
relevant precedent that should have been considered in Baum. On the other
hand the Baum court relied on Wanamaker which was decided in light of
documents requiring no signature. At most Wanamaker advances the proposi-
tion that unsigned carbon copies are duplicate originals only when the
ribbon does not require a signature. It reasonably follows that the Wanamaker
case is doubtful authority to support the Baum decision.
Regardless of the fact that the duplicate original doctrine may be
limited to signed carbons in Pennsylvania, the court in Baum held an un-
signed carbon to be an original. Thus the court has expanded the Pennsyl-
vania meaning of "original." The scope of this decision will be seen in the
future when it is decided whether this holding will be narrowly construed since
a statute was involved or whether this decision will become a part of the
best evidence rule of Pennsylvania and pertain to all documents.
Despite the questionable case authority cited by the majority in Baum,
there is sufficient reason to justify its holding. When construing a statute one
must constantly be aware of the battery of rules dealing with statutory con-
struction. 0 The dissenting opinion in Baum supported its view by citing a
25. 332 Pa. 522, 2 A.2d 731 (1938).
26. Id. at 526, 527, 2 A.2d at 733, 734.
27. 361 Pa. 598, 65 A.2d 683 (1949).
28. Id. at 601, 65 A.2d at 684 (Emphasis added).
29. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 342, 357, 374 (1959).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 531-566 (1952).
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rule of construction a Though the majority did not cite a specific rule of
construction, it did consider many points32 that could have been developed
under these rules.
Section 533 of the Statutory Construction Act provides:
. ..technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a
peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in this act, shall be
construed according to such peculiar meaning or definition. 33
The courts have construed this to mean that words with a precise and settled
legal meaning must be interpreted in the same sense in statutes.3 4 The. cases
also say that if there is no precise meaning of a word then the court "must
look to the intention of the legislature to determine the scope and meaning of
the language. '3 5 It is contended that there is no precise meaning of the word
"original" in section 180.7(1) since there are no cases defining its meaning.
Since no case law has developed concerning the meaning of "original" as
used in section 180.7 (1) there certainly is no precise meaning of the word and
the intent of the legislature becomes relevant.
The need to consider the intent of the legislature in construing section
180.7(1) and "original" is stressed in section 551 of the Statutory Construc-
tion Act3" which provides "the object of all interpretation and construction of
laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." To determine
what the legislature intended when section 180.7(1) was enacted it is
necessary to view a part of the history of the thirty day restriction.
The Wills Act of 1917 contained a thirty day restriction on charitable
bequests37 similar to section 180.7(1) of the present act. It must be noted
that there were no exceptions to the 1917 restriction and the consequences
were often harsh.3 8 In adding the two exceptions to section 180.7(1) of the
1947 Wills Act it was the intention of the legislature to remedy the harsh-
31. 418 Pa. at 416, 211 A.2d at 527.
32. 418 Pa. at 411, 211 A.2d at 524.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 533 (1952).
34. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 365 Pa. 153, 74 A.2d 123 (1950).
35. Appeal of Ryder, 365 Pa. 149, 74 A.2d 123 (1950).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551 (1952).
37. That act, repealed since by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7(1) (1950) provided
in part that:
No estate, real or personal, shall be bequeathed or devised to any body politic,
or to any person in trust for religious or charitable uses, except the same be done
by will at least thirty days before the decease of the testator ... ; and all disposi-
tions of property contrary hereto shall be void and go to the residuary legatee,
heirs or next of kin, according to law.
38. Hartman's Estate, 320 Pa. 321, 182 A.2d 234 (1936). Where in July 1931
testatrix executed a will containing charitable bequests. On July 28, 1932 a subsequent
will was executed containing similar charitable gifts. The next day testatrix died. The
charitable gifts of the 1932 will were held void under the thirty day restriction despite
the evidence of charitable intent in the 1931 will.
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ness of cases like Hartman's Estate.39 This intent is evidenced by the com-
ment to section 180.7(1) which says "the last sentence of the new clause
covers the case in which a testator has been charitably inclined and then
changes his will in some respect within thirty days of death (citing Hart-
man). ' '4° The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said, "it is clear that
section 180.7(1) of the Wills Act of 1947 should be liberally construed in
order to effectuate the object of the Act which was to modify the prior harsh
law and to promote justice."
'41
Certainly the legislature intended the second exception of section 180.7(1)
to validate charitable bequests when the charitable intent of a testator existed
prior to the thirty day restriction. To avoid fraud the statute provides a
testator's prior intent can be proven only by introducing the original prior
will as evidence of the intent. In construing "original" to include an un-
executed carbon copy it must be said that the court has upheld the intent of
the legislature to remedy the harshness of the 1917 Act. Had the court held
that only the ribbon could satisfy as an "original" under section 180.7(1)
this narrow construction clearly would have defeated the intent of the legisla-
ture to uphold charitable bequests if the testator's intent existed prior to the
thirty day restriction. Undoubtedly the decision of Baum will precipitate cries
that the doors have been opened to fraud 42 since the carbon was unexecuted.
This is partially answered by the majority in Baum when it conditions the
admission in evidence of the unexecuted carbon copy upon proper authentica-
tion.43 This cry of fraud may also be answered by the fact that the contents
of a lost or destroyed will can be proven by copies44 and parol45 when offered
for probate. Thus, as mentioned in Baum,46 it would hardly appear reason-
able to require stricter proof under section 180.7(1) than is necessary to
prove a will at probate. This is true since the will offered at probate is being
used to dispose of property while the prior will in section 180.7(1) is being
offered to prove prior intent.
Admittedly the admission of the unexecuted carbon creates a possibility
of fraud. The merits of Baum must also be considered. Baum has upheld the
remedial intent of the legislature and most important the case permits dis-
39. Ibid.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7(1) Joint State Government Commission Com-
ment (1950).
41. McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 481, 131 A.2d 124, 128 (1957).
42. 418 Pa. at 416, 211 A.2d at 527.
43. 418 Pa. at 412, 211 A.2d at 525.
44. One of the earliest reported cases advancing this proposition is In re Foster,
87 Pa. 67 (1878), affirming, 13 Phila. 567 (Pa. Orphan's Ct. 1877).
45. Scott's Estate, 147 Pa. 89, 23 Atl. 212 (1892).
46. 418 Pa. at 412, 211 A.2d 525.
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position of the testatrix's estate according to her wishes. A narrow interpreta-
tion of "original" in section 180.7(1) would have defeated both legislative
and testamentary intent.
The litigation of the Baum case was unnecessary and could have been
avoided had the attorney for the testatrix acted with greater caution. As the
facts indicate, the testatrix was ill and hospitalized. This should have served
as immediate notice that the testatrix could possibly die within the thirty day
restrictive period of section 180.7(1). Even though an attorney writes a
will for a perfectly healthy individual he owes his client the obligation to
see that the client's testamentary wishes are fulfilled and not defeated by
section 180.7(1). When an attorney is confronted with making a subsequent
will as in the Baum case there are at least three possibilities available to
avoid section 180.7(1) making the charitable bequest invalid should the
testator die within thirty days of executing his subsequent will.
The first method that can be used is to come within the second exception
to section 180.7(1). All an attorney must do is retain his client's prior will
for thirty days as proof of charitable intent of the client. Baum has expanded
this exception of section 180.7(1) so that now an attorney may retain a copy
of the prior will in his files as proof of the charitable intent. It would be ad-
visable to place a notation on this filed will or copy to the effect that it has
been revoked by a subsequent will. This notation would eliminate the possible
confusion of having two executed wills at probate or the possibility of having
the revoked prior will mistakenly probated should the subsequent will be-
come later lost or destroyed. In addition to the use of the second exception
to section 180.7(1) the attorney has two other methods to protect his client
against the thirty day restriction.
Charitable bequests can be protected by adding a codicil to the prior
will instead of making a new will. It is the law of wills 47 that a subsequent
will revokes a prior will and Pennsylvania cases hold such.48 This is not
true when a codicil is added to a will. "In the case of a codicil no revocation
of the will is presumed. The terms of a codicil indicate an addition."'49 The
purpose of a codicil is to modify or add and it changes a will only to the
extent it is inconsistent with the will."° The codicil and the will to which it
is added are construed together and read as one instrument.5 1 When a codicil
is added to a will it republishes the will and "the will speaks from the date
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1950).
48. Gray's Estate, 365 Pa. 411, 76 A.2d 169 (1950).
49. Boyer Estate, 372 Pa. 553, 556, 94 A.2d 721, 722 (1953).
50. Schattenberg's Estate, 269 Pa. 90, 93, 112 At. 67, 69 (1920).
51. Rainear's Estate, 304 Pa. 539, 543, 156 At. 166, 167 (1931).
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of the codicil." 52 Though a codicil usually republishes the will as of the date
of the codicil there is an exception to this rule when charitable bequests are
involved. If a codicil is added to a will containing charitable bequests within
thirty days of the testator's death and the codicil does not alter the charitable
gifts53 it has been held that these charitable bequests are valid.54 As a matter
of policy the courts have said that such a will is deemed to have been made
at its original date and not the date the codicil is added. Thus if an attorney
must alter a will and it is not necessary to change the charitable bequests he
can add a codicil and be assured of protecting the validity of the charitable
bequests should his client die within thirty days of his making the change.
It should be noted that under the facts of Baum such a codicil would have
been feasible since the changes involved were a reduction of a bequest to a
friend and a change of executors.
If the circumstances dictate the making of a new will as opposed to a
codicil an attorney can still protect his client against the thirty day restric-
tion. A comment to section 180.7(1) of the Wills Act states: "Of course, a
testator may still provide expressly in his new will that it shall not revoke
charitable gifts in his former will if he dies within thirty days." 55 With the
addition of this small clause to any subsequent will an attorney guarantees
the validity of charitable bequests for his client. The right of a testator to
preserve charitable bequests of his prior will is provided in section 180.7(1)
of the Wills Act.
Such is recognized by the statute when it provides "unless the
testator directs otherwise." This simply acknowledges, statutorily,
the former right which the testator had to save a prior charitable
bequest by inserting a provision in his will or codicil to that effect.
56
Under this provision it is also possible to alter the bequests contained in the
prior will. An example of how this would be done is:
If I should die within thirty days of execution of this will I direct
the charitable bequests (to X) of my prior will of Sept. 1955 shall
remain unrevoked. In this case both wills shall be probated. If I
survive for more than thirty days after execution of this will I revoke
completely my will of Sept. 1955. The charitable bequests (to Z)
of my 1958 will shall control.
57
52. Hickman's Estate, 308 Pa. 230, 237, 162 Atl. 168, 170 (1932).
53. Hickman's Estate, 308 Pa. 230, 162 Atl. 168 (1932) (Testator substituted a
legatee). Darlington's Estate, 289 Pa. 297, 137 Atl. 268 (1927) (substitution of
executor).
54. Carl's Appeal, 106 Pa. 635, 641, 642 (1884). See Darlington's Estate, 289 Pa.
297, 307, 137 Atl. 268, 271 (1927).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7(1) Joint State Commission Comment (1950).
56. Phillips Estate, 12 Fid. Rep. 492, 495 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1962).
57. Id. at 492.
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From the above illustrations it is evident that several possibilities are
available to the attorney when he must alter a will containing charitable
bequests. These suggestions have been made to provide a starting point and
to briefly indicate to attorneys the need for detailed study of section 180.7(1)
and its surrounding case law when dealing with charitable bequests.
WAYNE N. CoaDEs
